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ELSIE LOPER et al., Hespoudcnts, v. OAlVllGIWN E. MORRISON et al., Defendants; ARDEN F AHlHS, INO. (a
Oorporation), Appellant.
[1] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Employer-Scope of J:1mployment.-An employee of a dairy corporation who was using his
own automobile, after regular working hours, to collect a delinquent account when his cal' collided with another automobile
was acting within the'scope of his employment, although the
delinquent customer, whose credit had not been approved by
the corporation, was classified as an "unauthorized account"
and owed the corporation money when the employee took over
the route, where collections made by the employee were turned
over to the corporation and credited on the old balance, and
w~ere, in attempting to collect the account, the employee was
performing a duty imposed by his employer.
[2] Id.-Eviclence--Sufficioncy-Authority of Employee.-In an
action against a dairy corporation und its employee for injuries sustained in a collision with the employee's own automobile while he was u5ing it, after regular working hours, to col· lect a deliuquellt account, evidenoe thut the employee, to his
employer's knowledge, frequently called on customers after
his'regular hours, using his OWn car, supported a finding that
he was authorized to do this type of work at the time of the
accident;
"[Sa, Sbl ld.-Persons Liable-Employer-Scope of Employment.Business Personal to Employee.-In au action against a dairy
corp~ration and its employee for injuries sustained in a collision with the employee's own automobile while he was using
it, after regular working hours, to collect a delinquent account
after he had taken another employee home, it could not be said,
as a:matter of law, that in taking the other employee home the
driver abandoned the business of his employer, entered upon
· Ii. mission of his own and had not re-entered his employer'S
· busi?ess when the accident occurred, where it was within his
authority to collect accounts at that time.
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 491; 5 Am.Jur. 709.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5J Automobiles, § 169(1); [2] Automobiles, § 243; [3] Automobiles, § 169(4); [4] Master and Servant,
§ 207; [6, 7J Master and Servant; § 207(6); [8J Automobiles, § 291;
[9-11J Evidence, § 326a; [12J Appeal and Error, § 1607; [13J Damages, § 95; [14J Appeal and Error, § 1533-3; [15, 16] Automobiles,
§ 316; [17] Damages, § 207.

[4] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Scope of
Employment.-In each case involving <:cope of employment, all
of the relevant circumstances must be considered and weighed
in relation to one another.
[6] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Employer-Scope of Employment.-With regard to whether or not an employee of a dairy
corporation, using his own automobile, after regular working
hours, to collect a delinquent account after he had taken It fellow employee home, was acting within the scope of his employment at the time his car collided with another automobile, the
factors to be considered are the intent of the employee, the
nature, time and place of his conduct, his actual and implied
authority, the work he was hired to do, the incidental acts that
the employer should reasonably have expected would be done,
and the amount of freedom allowed the employee in performing his duties.
[6] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Scope of
Employment-Acts of Servant for Independent Purpose.-An
employer's liability is not necessarily terminated by reason of
the fact that the employee combines a private purpose of his
own with the business of his employer.
[7] Id.-Liability to Third Persons-Scope of Employmen1i--'Acts
of Servant for Independent Purpose.-An employee's deviation
from the most direct route for the purpose of getting something
to eat and taking a fellow employee home, before going to a
Ilustomer's home to collect a delinquent account for his employer, does not necessarily constitute an abandonment of the
employer's business.
.
[8] Automobiles - Pro'vince of Court and Jury - Employment Deviation from Employer's Business.-In an action against a
dairy corporation and its employee for injuries sustained in a
collision with the employee's own automobile while he was using it, after regular working hours, to collect a delinquent account, the employee's conduct, after finding no one at the delinquent customer's home, in going to a tavern and in taking a
fellow employee home before returning to the customer's home,
presented a question of fact as to whether the driver had entirely abandoned the business of his employer.
[9] Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Business Records.-The
purpose of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1953e-1953h) is to enlarge the operation
of the business records exception to the hearsay evidence rule.
[6] See 16 Cal.Jur.ll01; 35 Am.Jur. 989.
[9] See 20 Am.Jur. 881.
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[10] Id.-Documentary Evidence - Business Records - Hospital
Records.-The business entry statutes are not limited to entries in commercial enterprises, and hospital records are properly included within their operation.
[11] Id.-Documentary Evidence-Business Records.-It is thE'
object of the business records statutes to eliminate the necessity of calling each witness, and to substitute the record of the
transaction or event. It is not necessary that the person making the entry have personal knowledge of the transaction.
[12] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Exclusion of Evidence.-In an action for personal injuries requiring hospital
care, while a nurses' record containing a written record 01
opinions of nurses as to the physical condition of a hospital
patient was relevant on the issue of the nature and extent of
plaintiff's injuries, the exclusion of such evidence was not preju.
dicial to defendant where such record, instead of refuting tes·
timony that plaintiff suffered from headaches and many pain.
ful bruises and sore spots, supported such testimony.
[18] Damages - Excessive Damages - Personal Injuries. - An
award of $2,000 to a wife and $600 to the husband for injuries
sustained by the wife was not so excessive as to be disturbed on
appeal, where the wife spent 26 days in the hospital, where her
injuries caused her much pain and suffering, both physical and
mental, while she was at the hospital and after she went home,
where .doctor and hospital bills exceeded $400 and money was
expended to repair the automobile involved in the accidl'nt,
and where for some time the wife was unable to carry on .!Jer
usual duties helping the husband with his business.
[14] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Remarks Respecting Evidence.-In a personal injury action, remarks made by
the trial judge to defendant's attorney in connection with rulings on thE' admissibility of evidence did not constitute prejudicial misconduct, where such remarks could not be construed
as indicating that the judge was partial toward plaintiff, and
where the jury were specifically instructed that if the judge
had said or done anything which indicated that he was inclined
to favor either party, it should be disregarded.
[15] Automobiles-Instructions-Employment-Respondeat Superior.-In an action against a corporation and its employee for
injuries sustained when the employee's automobile collided with
another automobile, the court did not err in giving instructions
dealing with the doctrine of respondeat superior, where these
instructions properly stated the theory found applicable in the
case.
[16] Id.-Instructions-Employment-Scope of Employment.-In
an action against a corporation and its employee for injuries
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·. d when the employee's automobile collid?d withfi ~n
sust ame
t . . tructlOns de nmg
other car, it was not erro~ t~ ~~fus:heo ::.~e ::::t abandomnent of
I
from liascope of employment an s a mg

~~ft~,y:~:!eb!t~!: ;:f~~~~:se~;~ct t!:r:m~:?neradeqUateIY
covered these subjects.

[17]

F t

Pain and Suffering.-In a

Damage~Instr~~tio~~a:n~~eerror to give instructions dealpersonal mJury ac lOn, 1 h
there was testimony that at the
w e:: still suffering from headaches,
ing with futur~ dlamla?et"ff
time of the trIa p am 1 w
.
nervousness and pain.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Leslie E. Still, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Russell H. Pray, Henry F. Walker, S. J. Nordorf and
William C. Price for Appellant.
11 Albert D. White and Kenneth Sperry for
Josep h A . B a,
Respondents.

GIBSON, C. J.-Mrs. Elsie Loper (h~reafter called plaind her husband brought this action for damages. ret'ff)
s~ltina; from an automobile accident in w:i~h b~ c~:f::~::
b Mrs Loper was struck by one opera e
Jorriso~, an employee of defendant Arden Farms, Inc. Fro~
a judgment against both defendants, Arden Farms, Inc. (here
after called defendant) alone has appealed.
k d l' .
.
1 d by defendant to ma e e lverles
..
d'
t d rea
MorrlSon was emp oye
of milk and other dairy products Wlthm a eSI~a e aD'
to collect from cust?mers and to so.li~itd n~w. :~~:-:~t b~~
liveries were made m a truck furms e
Y
d 'r't
Morrison used his own car in collecting accounts an so ICI •
in new business after regular hours.
,
~n the afternoon of the accident Morrison left defendant s
. h's own car to call on a prospective customer and to
offi ce In 1
M H
He was
collect a delinquent account from a rs. anson.
accompanied by Edward Dolan, a fello~ employee, to. whom
he had offered a ride home. After .calhng on the .new customer they went to the Hanson reSIdence about 4.00 p. :but found no one there. The HallSon account had been e-
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linquent for some time, and Morrison had made numerous
unsuccessful attempts to collect it. He had learned from
past ~xperience ~hat the Hansons were likely to be at home
later m the. eVelll?~, and he decided to call again about 5 :30
p. m. WhIle waItmg for Mrs. Hanson to return Morrison
who had not eaten since breakfast, went with Dolan to ~
tavern near Dolan's home for a lunch of sandwiches and
beer, and then took ?olan home. The accident happened
about 5 :30 p. m. whIle Morrison, returning from Dolan's
~ome, 'was on his way to collect the Hanson account. Dolan
lIved about two ~il.es outside the area covered by the milk
route, and the collIsIOn occurred before Morrison reached the
boundaries of his route.
. [1~ Defendant contends that Morrison was not acting
wIthm the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. ~irst, it is argued that the IIanson account was owed
to MorrIson personally and that in attempting to collect the
same he was engaged in his own business. Certain customers
whos.e credi;, had not been approved by defendant were
classIfied as . u~~utborized accounts." Ddvers were required
to assume lIabIlity and furnish bond to protect defendant
from losses caused by the failure of such customers to pay
for prod,?-cts sold them. Such liability did not attach, however, unt1~ a~ter the employment of the driver was terminated,
and was lImIted to a tota! of $100. Approximately one-third
of th~ ,customers. on MorrIson's route, including Mrs. Hanson,
were unauthorIzed accounts." Mrs. Hanson, who had been
a customer. of Arden for a long time, owed defendant $25
~hen MorrISon took over the route. Although Morrison contI?ued to deliver dairy products to her, collections made by
hIm were turn:d over to defendant and credited on the old
b~la~ce. MorrIson worked on a straight salary with no commISSIons, and all the money he collected was turned over to
defendant. He did not buy milk from Arden and sell it to
customers. The money due from Mrs. Hanson was owed
t? defendant and in attempting to collect the account, Morrl~o~ was performing a duty imposed by his employer and
wIthm the. scope of .his employment. [2] And there is evidence
that MorrIson, to hIS employer's knowledge frequently called
up?n . custom~rs after his regular hours, ~sing his own car
ThIS IS s~ffi.clent to support a finding that he was authorized
to do thIS type of work at the time the accident took place.
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[Sa] Defendant next contends that we are bound to concluile as a matter of law, that when Morrison left the Hanson
hous~ to take Dolan home, he abandoned the business of his
employer and entered upon a mission of his own and had not
re-entered his employer's business when the accident occurred,
and that therefore he was not acting within the scope, of his
employment at the time of the accident. Th~ general rule
in these cases is stated in Kruse v. White Bros., 81 Cal.App.,
86, 93 [253 P. 178], recently quoted with approval in Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360, 373 [94 P.2d 590] : ' "Whether
there has been a deviation so material or substantial as to
constitute a complete departure is usually a question of fact .
In some cases the deviation may be so marked, and in others
so slight relatively, that the court can say that no conclusion
other than that the act was or was not a departure could
reasonably be supported; while in still others the deviation
may be so uncertain in extent and degree in view of the facts
and circumstances as to make the question of what inferences
should be drawn from the evidence properly one for the
jury." (See also Rest., Agency, sec. 228, Comment d.)
Courts have held as a matter of law that an employee was
not in the scope of his employment when the evidence clearly
showed a complete abandonment. (Gordoy v. Flaherty, 9 Cal.
2d 716 [72 P.2d 538] ; Peccolo v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal.
2d 532 [66 P.2d 651] ; Kish v. California State, Automobile
Assn., 190 Cal. 246 [212 P. 27]; Martinelli v. Stabnau, 11
Cal.App.2d 38 [52 P.2d 956] ; Ho;nchett v. Wiseley, 107 Cal.
App. 230 [290 P. 311]; GOlf,sse v. Lowe, 41 Cal.App. 715
[183 P. 295].) But in many other cal;!es it has been held
that a jury question was presented. (Westberg v. Willde,
14 Cal.2d 360 [94 P.2d 590]; Waack v. Maxwell Hardware
Co., 210 Cal. 636 [292 P. 966] ; Cain v. Marquez, 31 Cal.App.
2d 430 [88 P.2d 200] ; Kruse v. ",hite Bros., 81 Cal.App. 86
[253 P. 178] ; Dennis v. Miller Autornobt1e Co., 73 Cal.App.
293 [238 P. 739]; see 2 Mecham on Agency (2d ed.), sec.
1916, p. 1491.) In deciding the case before us the results
reached in other decisions are helpful but not necessarily
controlling. (See Waack v. Maxwell Hardware Co., 210 Cal.
636, 640 [292 P. 966].) [4] In each case involving scope
of employment all of the relevant circumstances must be considered and weighed in relation to one another. (Waack v.
Maxwell Hardware Co" 210 Cal. 636, 640 [292 P. 966] ; Cain
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v. Marquez, 31 Cal.App.2d 430, 441 [88 P.2d 200]; Fiocco
v. Garver, 234 N.Y. 219 [137 N.E. 309) j Bryan v. Bunis, 208
App.Div. 389 [203 N.Y.S. 634]; 2 Mecham on Agency (2d
ed.), sec. 1880, pp. 1461-1462, and, generally, pp. 1457-1491;
Rest., Agency, secs. 228-237.) [5] Under these authorities the
factors to be considered, insofar as pertinent to this case are
the intent of the employee, the nature, time, and place of his
c~nduct, his actual and implied authority, the work he was
hIred to do, the incidental acts that the employer should
reasonably have expected would be done, and the amount of
freedom allowed the employee in performing his duties.
cab] Under the circumstances of this case we cannot hold
as a matter of law that Morrison's trip to the tavern and to
Dol~n's home ~onstituted an abandonment of his employer's
?usmess. As saId heretofore, it was within: Morrison's authorIty to collect accounts at the time the accident occurred.
[6] The employer's liability was not necessarily terminated
by reaso~ of the ~act that M?rrison combined a private pur?ose of hIS own WIth the busmess of his employer. As stated
m Ryan v. Farrell, 208 Cal. 200, 204 [280 P. 945): "It is the
estab~is?ed r~le in this jurisdiction that where the serv,ant is
com~mmg hIS own business with that of his master, or attendmg to both at substantially the same time no nice inquiry will be made as to which business the serv~nt was actually enga.ged in when a third person was injured; but the
master WIll be held responsible, unless it clearly appears that
t~e servant could not have been directly or indirectly serving
hIS master.': Thus, if the accident had occurred on the trip
from the daIry to the Hanson home prior to 4 p. m., the jury
clearly could have found that Morrison was acting within his
employment although he intended thereafter to get something
to eat, and. take Dolan home. [7] Further, a deviation from
the most direct route for these purposes before going to the
Hanson home would not necessarily have constituted an abandonment. (See Westberg v. Will de, 14 Ca1.2d 360,372 [94 P
2d 590] ; Gain v. Marquez, 31 Cal.App.2d 430 [88 P.2d 200] :
Gayton v. Pacific Fruit Express, 127 Cal.App. 50 [15 P.2d 217) ;
K~use v. White Bros., 81 Cal.App. 86 [253 P. 178] ; Dennis v.
M~ller Automobil~ Go., 73 Cal.App. 293 [238 P. 739].) In
the Kruse and Cam cases, supra, detours of several miles were
held to present questions of fact. The deviation cases alth~ugh not identical ~ith the situation here involved,' are
qUIte analogous. MorrIson, upon finding no one at home, be-
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lieved that he would have to wait over an hour before he could
see Mrs. Hanson. If he had spent this time in his car in front
of the house he would have remained within the scope of his
employment. [8] His conduct in going elsewhere for some
private purpose while waiting to perform his specific duties
presented a question of fact as to whether he had entirel~
abandoned the business of his employer. (See Robertson v.
Spitler, 153 Minn. 395 [190 N.W. 992].) The employer might
reasonably expect that his employee,· while so waiting, would
engage in some activities for his own purposes. Here, Morrison, who began work'at 3 a. m., had not eaten since breakfast,
and the fact that he went to a tavern for sandwiches and beer
does not require us to hold that he had abandoned his employ.
ment, particularly in view of his testiinony that he would not
have been at the tavern if he had not been waiting to call upon
Mrs. Hanson. And, considering the time he had to wait,
we cannot hold as a matter of law that it was unreasonable
for him to travel somewhat less than two miles for this purpose. Similarly, under these circuITlStances, we cannot say
that his going a short distance farther to take Dolan home
was such an unreasonable means of using his time that it
must be deemed an abandonment of his employment. Mor·
rison's purpose at the time of the accident was to serve his
employer, and it could be reasonably inferred that such purpose continued throughout the period he waited to see Mrs.
Hanson. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding
that Morrison was acting within the scope of his employment
at the time of the accident.
'
Defendant also contends that the ~rial court erred in
excluding from evidence a portion of ,a hospital chart called
a "nurses' record." The chart contained entries by nurses
relative to the condition of the plaintiff during the time she
spent in the hospital after the accident, and was offered to
refute testimony as to the nature and ex~ent of plaintiff's
mJuries, Defendant contends that the record should have
been admitted under sections 1953e·1953h of the Code of
Civil Procedure, known as the "Uniform Business Records
as Evidence Act." Section 1953f provides: "A record of an
act, condition or event, shall, in so far as relevant, be com·
petent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and
if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near
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the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion
of the court, the sources of information, method and time of
preparation were such as to justify its admission." Section
1953e provides: "The term 'business' as used in this artide
sha~l include every kind of business, profession, occupation,
call1l1g or operation of institutions, whether carried on for
profit or not." Section 1953g requires that "This article
shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those States which
enact it." [9] The purpose of this act is to enlarge the
operation of the business records exception to the hearsay
evidence rule. The common law exception is based o~
the assumption that records kept in the O'eneral course of
business usually are accurate, and may be'" used in case of
necessity, as evidence of the matter recorded. cI-Iale, Hospital Re~ords as Evidence, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 99, 100.) But the
exceptIOn has been hedged about with so many burdensome
restrictions that legislation has been necessary to secure wides?r~ad use. of ~uch rec0rds. Speaking of the desirability of
SImIlar legIslatIOn, the United States Supreme Court, in the
recent case of Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 [63 S.Ot. 4;77,
481, 87 L.Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719J), stated: "The several
hundred years of history behind the Act (Wigmore supra
sees. 1517-1520) indicate the nature of the reforms ~hich it
was designed to effect. It should of course be liberally interpreted so as to do away with the anachronistic rules which
gave rise to its need and at which it was aimed."
[10] The business entry statutes are not limited to entries
~n commer~ial. enterprises, and hospital records are properly
ll1~luded wIthIll theIr operation. (Ulm v. Moore-McCormack
L~nes, 115 F.2d 492; Borucki v. MacIfenzie Bros. Co., 125
Conn. 92 [3 A.2d 224] ; Beverley Beach Club, Inc. v. Marron,
172 Md. 471 [192 A. 278]; Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358
[272 N.W. 706] ; Conlon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
56 R.I. 88 [183 A. 850] ; and see VI, Wigmore on Evidence
(3d ed.), sec. 1707, p. 36; 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 104; 144 A.L.R.
731.) There is no reason to believe that a hospital record is
not as truthful as a record kept by a commercial firm. It is
a rec~rd upon which treatment of the patient is based and
e~perIe.nce .has shown it to be reliable and trustworthy. '(See
dISCUSSIOn III Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439,
447 [137 A. 431.) [11] It is the object of the business
records statutes to eliminate the necessity of calling each wit-

ness, and to substitute the record of the, transaction or event.
It is not necessary that the person making the entry have
personal knowledge of the transaction. (Storm & Butts v.
Lipscomb, 117 Cal.App. 6, 20 [3 P.2d 567] ; Patrick v. Tetzlaff, 46 Cal.App. 243 [189 P. 115] j Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934, 937.) Plaintiff cites several California cases in support of its contention
that hospital records are not admissible in evidence. (Estate·
of Flint, 100 Cal. 391 [34 P. 863]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50
Cal.App.2d 486 [123 P.2d 544] ; Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 Cal.
App. 506 [2 P.2d 870].) All of these cases were tried before
the Uniform Act became effective in this state, and are not
controlling.
'
[12] The Uniform Act provides that the record is competent evidence if authenticated in the prescribed man-.
ner and ". . . if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of
information, method and time of preparation were such as
to justify its admission." (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1953f.) Defendant argues that the foundation presented in this case
was sufficient to justify the admission of the nurses' record
in evidence and that therefore it was error for the court to
exclude it. It is unnecessary, however, for us to determine
whether the trial court was justified in rejecting the record
on these grounds since we are of the opiD.ion no error prejudicial to the defendant has been shown by its exclusion.
Before this court can reverse a judgment for improper exclusion of evidence, an examination of the entire cause must·
show that the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage
of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, sec. 4%.) The testimony
which the nurses' record was offered to refute was to the effect that while plaintiff was in the hospital she suffered from
headac~es and many painful bruises and sore spots, that she
was nervous and hysterical, and that she was given pills to
help her to sleep and to ease her pain. The nurses' record
does not refute this evidence. In fact many notations in the
chart support plaintiff's testimony. Those notations show
that plaintiff had frequent headaches and suffered from pain
hi. various parts of her body, that she was nervous, and that
she was given a considerable quantity of sedatives and other
drugs. Defendant argues that other notations in the chart
to the effect that plaintiff did not complain, or that she was
23 C.2d-20
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comfortable, resting or sleeping, refute evidence of pain and
suffering. The entry "no complaints" as it was used here
does not indicate that plaintiff did not suffer, nor that she
did not complain of her pain and nervousness. A witness
called by defendant to authenticate the chart testified that
it was the practice of the nurse who kept the chart to make
the entry "no complaints" whenever nothing special was reported to her by the nurse in charge of the patient. And
notations that plaintiff slept or rested, and that she was comfortable at times, do not contradict the specific evidence as
to her pain and suffering. Therefore, while the nurses' chart
contained relevant evidence on the issue of the nature and
extent of plaintiff's injuries, we cannot say that its exclusion
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
[13] Defendant contends further that even though full
credence be given the testimony introduced by plaintiff, the
judgment awarding plaintiff $2,000 and her husband $600
was excessive. An appellate court will not disturb a verdict
unless it is so grossly excessive as to immediately suggest
passion or prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jnry.
(Loeb v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143, 164 [9 P.2d 199]; Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal.App.2d
!41, 148 [~28 P.2d 7?5P Plaintiff spent twenty-six days
In the hospItal. Her InJnr.y caused her much pain and suffering, both physical and mental, while she was at the hospital and after she went home. Doctor and hospital bills
exceeded. $400, and money was expended to repair the IJopers'
automobIle. For some time plaintiff was unable to carryon
her usual duties helping her husband with his business. This
evidence is sufficient to justify the amount awarded.
[14] It is contended that the trial court was guilty of
prejud~cial misconduct. Many remarks of the trial judge
are claImed to be erroneous, but only two were assigned as
error at the trial. Both of these remarks were made to defendant's attorney in connection with rulings on the admissibility of evidence. They could not be construed as indicating that the judge was in any way partial toward plaintiff
or her case, and the jury was specifically instructed that if
the judge had said or done anything which indicated that he
was inclined to favor either party, it should be disregarded.
P5.] Def~ndant argues that the court erred in giving certam mstructlOns dealing with respondeat superior. These
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instructions properly stated the theory we have already found
applicable in this case. [16] Defendant further claims that
the court improperly refused to give instructions defining
"scope of employment" and stating the rule that abandonment of employment by the employee relieves the e:inployer
from liability. But other instructions which were given
adequately covered these subjects. [17] Defendant also
contends that the court erred in giving instructions dealing
with future damage, because, it is claimed, there was no evidence to support such damage. There was testimony,however, that at the time of the trial plaintiff still was suffering
from headaches, nervousness and pain. This evidence tended
to prove future damages and was sufficient to justify the instruction. (See Bauman v. City and County of San Francisco, 42 Cal.App.2d 144, 163 [108 P.2d 989] ; Parsell v. San
Diego Consolo G. & E. Co., 46 Cal.App.2d· 212[115 P.2d
539] .)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. I cannot agree that it is a question of fact whether Morrison was acting within the scope
of his employment at the time of the accident. If the facts
are undisputed it is a question of law whether liability arises
from such facts. (San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. San
Diego County, 16 Ca1.2d 142 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416] ;
Leis V. City and COttnty of San Francisco, 213 Cal. 256, 258
[2 P.2d 26] ; Gaston V. Hisashi Tsuruda, 5 Cal.App,2d 639,
642 [43 P.2d 355] ; Bell V. McColgan, 68 Cal.App. 478, 482
[229 P. 858]; Osgood v. City of San Diego, 17 Cal.App.2d
345 [62 P.2d 195].) Ordinarily the court must decide such
questions, although occasionally the task may fall to the jury.
Thus in the field of negligence if the court does not establish
a standard of reasonable conduct the case goes to the jury
to determine whether the defendant has acted as a reasonably prudent man would act under the circumstances. The
jury then has the burden not only of deciding what the facts
are but of formulating a standard of reasonable conduct.
(Clinkscales V. Carver, 22 Ca1.2d 72, 75 [136 P.2d 777].)
As a general rule, however, the court determines. the law and
the jury the facts, unless it appears that the issue is one that
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the jury can determine better than the court. (See Brown,
Law and Fact, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 899.) In the present case the
court can determine better than the jury the extent of the
vicarious liability to which the Arden Milk Company should
be subject.
The majority opinion cites section 228, comment d, of the
Restatement of Agency, which states that it is the function
of the court to determine whether an act of a servant is within
the scope of his employment "if the answer is clearly indicated, " but that otherwise the question is for the jury. If
the facts are undisputed, however, it is solely a question of
law whether acts are within the scope of the employment.
If the question of law is a complicated one there is all the
more reason that it should' be determined by the court rather
than the jury.
There is no dispute as to the facts in the present case. After
reaching the place where he was to collect a bill, Morrison
left to obtain a meal, transport Dolan home, and await the
time for another effort to collect the bill. The undisputed
evidence shows that it was no part of Morrison's duty to take
Dolan home, and that he did so merely as a personal favor.
The accident occurred on the way back from Dolan's home,
some twenty blocks from the nearest point of Morrison's as-'
signed territory. It is my opinion that Morrison was returning from a personal mission and had not resumed his employment at the time of the accident and was therefore not
then acting within the scope of his employment. (Oordoy v.
Flaherty, 9 Ca1.2d 716 [72 P.2d 538] ; Peccolo v. Oity of Los
Angeles, 8 Ca1.2d 532 [66 P.2d 651] ; Kish v. Oalifornia State
Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246 [212 P. 27]; Martinelli v.
Stabnau, 11 Cal.App.2d 38 [52 P.2d 956] ; Hanchett v. Wiseley, 107 Cal.App. 230 [290 P. 311] ; Adams v. Tuxedo Land
00., 92 Cal.App. 266 [267 P. 926] ; Helm v. Bagley, 113 Cal.
App. 602 [298 P. 826].)
Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
17, 1944. Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.
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ROBERT E. BOYD, as Executor, etc., Appellant, v. W. L.
OSER, as Administrator with the Will Annexed, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Husband and Wife-Rights in Income from Community Property-Law Applicable.-The respective rights of the spouses in
the income from community property are determined by the
law existing at the date of acquisition of the capital or original community property from which such income arose; and
where the wife's rights at that date did not include the power
of testamentary disposition of the incoli1~ from community
property, that right was in the husband and could not be impaired or destroyed by subsequent legislation.
[2] Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property by
Wife.-Where the husband's rights under the law in force at
the date of acquisition of community property included the
right of retaining title to and control over the whole community property, including the income therefrom, upon the wife's
death, such right could not be divested or impaired by provisions in the wife's will which, if effective, would operate
to take from the husband upon her death a portion of either
the capital property or accumulations of the income therefrom, as this would be an unconstitutional impairment of a
vested property right.
[3] Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property by
Wife.-A wife does not have the power of testamentary disposition over the income from community property acquired
prior to the effective date of the 1923 amendment of Civ. Code,
§ 1401 (now Prob. Code, § 201), which declares that, on the
. death of either spouse, one-half of the community property
belongs to the surviving spouse and the other half is subject
to testamentary disposition of the decedent, although such income may have accrued or have been received by the spouses
subsequent to the amendment.

[4] Id.-Rents, Issue!> and Pro:fits.-Although there is no constitutional or statutory provision expressly declaring that rents,
issues and profits of community property shall partake of, the
[2] See 3 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SUpp. 704.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 96, [2,3, 5]
Husband and Wife, § 144~. [4] Husband and Wife, § 58.

